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Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2011. 690pp. $49.95

Since 2009, U.S.-China relations have
lurched from crisis to crisis, jeopardizing the “long peace” that has enabled
an extraordinary era of prosperity in
East Asia and beyond. As Washington
gropes for a new paradigm to structure
this all-important bilateral relationship, diplomats, military strategists,
and concerned citizens on both sides
of the Pacific would do well to reflect
carefully on Michael Swaine’s new
treatise, which is a masterpiece that
will set the standard in the field of
policy analysis for decades to come.
Among the book’s many virtues are
the balance and objectivity of its assessments. Swaine explores alternative
strategies, such as a more zero-sum
approach, on the one hand, that would
rely on a “grand coalition of democracies” to balance China, as well as, on
the other, the possibilities of a more
positive-sum approach that would
emphasize both compromise and joint
action against common, nontraditional
security threats. Ultimately, Swaine
concludes that the above approaches are
both “extreme . . . because they do not
share many of the assumptions underlying America’s current strategic objectives.” The judgment is based on dozens
of interviews with this country’s most
esteemed Asia hands. He reports that a
consensus exists on a mixed strategy, incorporating a delicate simultaneous balance between hedging and engagement.
Another key strength of this volume is
the extraordinary attention to detail—a
feature that will make this work, with
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its more than two hundred pages of
endnotes, an extremely valuable desk
reference and a capable survey of
what we collectively understand about
U.S.-China relations. The fact that the
book covers issues as disparate as naval
strategy, trade negotiations, and energy
cooperation—handling each of these
complex topics and many others with
admirable sophistication—is a tribute
to the wide experience, intellectual
depth, and solid research of the author.
In this respect, the book is without peer.
What makes this work truly exceptional,
however, is the bold and sober recommendations that flow from Swaine’s
dense analysis. To be sure, he offers a
panoply of practical solutions, such as
advocating the creation of a genuinely
strategic (vice policy) planning entity
in the While House and promoting a
much-needed regular, trilateral forum
bringing together Tokyo, Beijing, and
Washington around one table. However, he also directly challenges current
conventional wisdom among U.S. policy
makers, asserting that “U.S. maritime
predominance in the Western Pacific is
probably unsustainable over the long
term . . . [and] attempts to sustain this
predominance . . . are likely to prove
. . . destabilizing.” Also, breaking with
longtime U.S. policy, Swaine is critical
of Washington’s “hands-off ” approach
to the Taiwan issue, an approach that
has traditionally included a refusal to
negotiate with Beijing regarding arms
sales to Taiwan. Finally, Swaine also
boldly declares (contrary to deeply
embedded U.S. political culture) that
“China’s democratization should not
be a strategic objective of the United
States.” Such conclusions collectively
offer American strategists a new approach and much food for thought.
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In short, this comprehensive volume
offers a much-needed corrective to
tendencies in American strategic discourse that significantly favor military solutions to the dilemmas posed
by China’s rise over the hard work
of cooperation and compromise.
LYLE GOLDSTEIN

Naval War College

Arquilla, John. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits:
How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped
Our World. Lanham, Md.: Ivan R. Dee, 2011.
336pp. $27.50

Irregular warfare has been the topic du
jour over the last few years. A search of
any bookseller’s website turns up literally hundreds of recently published titles
on the subject. While not a bad thing,
this makes it harder for nonspecialists to
separate the wheat from the chaff. Much
recent literature in the field centers on
irregular tactics and techniques, especially U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while a smaller portion focuses on
armed groups. John Arquilla, however,
takes a different approach in Insurgents,
Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World,
by focusing more on irregular warriors
than on irregular wars. Like the figures
he portrays, Arquilla attacks the
conventional-war methods and heroes
of military history. He laments
continuing overreliance on traditional methods and classical theorists,
given the evidence that the world
is now far from conventional. As a
Naval Postgraduate School professor, Arquilla has studied and taught
this topic for over two decades.
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At the time of this book’s publication
there were more than thirty ongoing
conflicts worldwide, all irregular in nature, “primarily conducted through acts
of terrorism or more classic guerrilla
hit and run tactics.” This supports the
argument that “irregular is becoming
the new regular.” Arquilla asserts that we
must now look closely at the masters of
earlier times to understand the implications of this new age. The eighteen
individuals chosen here come from a
wide variety of backgrounds. Some,
such as Nathanael Greene and T. E. Lawrence, will be familiar to most readers.
However, warriors like Abdelkader and
Christiaan de Wet are probably largely
unknown to all but specialists in the
field. Instead of trying to categorize each
of them, he draws out common themes
they exhibited, most notably their
“sheer indomitability” and recurring
encounters with advanced technology.
In addition to thematic threads of
continuity, the author weaves connecting strands along national lines. The
French appear in seven chapters, six
times fighting against insurgents and
once, during the American Revolution, on the side of the insurgency. The
experience gained in these conflicts is
another theme used by the author to
bind several hundred years of warfare.
A similar continuity exists among
supporting actors. British involvement in multiple insurgencies provides
several opportunities to study Winston
Churchill’s personal connections.
Of note, most of the irregular warriors
highlighted in these chapters gained
fame by opposing the conventional
masters of their time. Commanders like
Charles Cornwallis or Ulysses S. Grant
usually found traditional methods
insufficient when facing guerrilla or
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